


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## MEMORANDUM

### *Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
9 June 1967

I. TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

1. The Turks do not want to become involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute and see no advantage in playing an active role in it. They have no aspirations to leadership in the Middle East, but rather see their interests primarily in terms of their relationships with the West. Moreover, they feel that overt active involvement in the Arab-Israeli controversy--even after the danger of fighting is past--would risk considerable liabilities to themselves without any commensurate prospect of significantly influencing the course of events.

2. In recent years the Turks have tried to improve their relations with the Arabs in order to gain support in the Cyprus dispute. (Turkish-Iraqi relations have been quite cordial in recent months.) Turkish hopes to receive such backing were fanned by Arab overtures during the current crisis offering assistance to Turkey on the Cyprus issue. The Turks are unwilling to jeopardize the prospect of this support by moves that might alienate the Arabs.

3. At the same time, the Turkish Government views Nasir with considerable suspicion

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Turkish leaders are not swayed by pleas for Islamic solidarity against Israel. Indeed, they are at bottom sympathetic to the Israelis, with whom they may strengthen an already close relationship

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They are also concerned that any move to assist the Arabs would run afoul of the US, for the Turkish leaders believe that the US basically favors the Israelis.

4. Hence, the Turks are following an overtly neutral posture and probably would prefer to confine themselves to support for any solution adopted by the UN. The Turkish Government feels particularly anxious to avoid getting involved in promoting any

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Western (i.e., NATO) solution, which by its very origin might alienate the Arabs. Also the Turks do not want to disturb their present relationships with the Soviets whom they see as backing the activist Arab states, especially the UAR and Syria. Indeed, the Turkish leaders are concerned at the prospect that the Arab-Israeli dispute might become to some extent an extension of the Cold War.

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## II. IRANIAN ATTITUDES AND POLICIES

1. Iran is taking a cautious approach to the Middle East war, although the Shah's sympathies lie with the Israelis. Iran has good relations with Israel, and Iranian crude oil meets 80 percent of Israeli requirements. Hatred of Egyptian President Nasir and fear of his ambitions in the Persian Gulf have been an important factor in Iranian foreign policy, and the Shah would be happy to see him destroyed. Nevertheless, the Shah does not want to endanger the relations Iran has painstakingly developed with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and Iraq.

2. Iran has been under pressure from these Arab countries since the crisis first developed to stop selling oil to Israel and to support strongly the Arab cause. The Iranian Government vigorously denied that it was selling oil to Israel, although the government-owned National Iranian Oil Company does in fact supply a large proportion of Iranian crude shipments to Israel. On 31 May the government issued a statement of support for the "legitimate rights of Moslem peoples." The press has attempted to strike a balance between criticism of Nasir and expressions of Moslem solidarity.

3. In private, the Shah has told US officials on 5 June that he hoped Nasir's forces would be humiliated, and that he thought the long-range US objective should be Nasir's destruction. He reiterated his long-standing thesis that US attempts to cultivate Nasir had merely whetted his aggressive tendencies, and, in general, seems to be taking an "I told you so" approach.

4. Although Iran has established good relations with the more moderate Arab states--particularly Jordan and Saudi Arabia--the extent of the Shah's influence over their leaders is probably quite limited. Apparently the Shah has already urged King Husayn and King Faysal not to break relations with

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the US, but such exhortations probably serve only as moral support for a course of action those monarchs would prefer to follow anyway.

5. The Shah has indicated his intention to continue oil shipments without interruption as normal commercial transactions

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Apparently shipments of refined products from Abadan have been unable to travel down the Shatt-al-Arab because of the refusal of Iraqi pilots to guide the ships. To the best of its ability, however, Iran is expected to continue oil shipments to the US and Western Europe. In fact, the Shah would probably snap up any chance to increase oil revenues. Presumably Iran will also continue selling oil to the Israelis unless Arab pressure gets much more severe.

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III. THE SITUATION IN JORDAN

1. King Husayn's viability depends in large part on the character of changes in Syria and Iraq as peace returns, on the degree of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, on Nasir's possible demise and on the over-all make-up of the postwar Middle East.

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2. The most immediate threats to Husayn's viability are the continued Israeli-Syrian hostilities and the ability of the public security service to maintain order when the numbness from battle wears thin and the shock of the total disaster is fully realized by the Jordanian population. This test of the public security force will probably come during the next several days. Their abilities to maintain order will remain critical for close to a month. Each day that there is no or little trouble in the form of popular demonstrations the odds for survival increase in Husayn's favor. At present there is no evidence of active public animosity toward the regime; reports from Beirut, not necessarily reflective of other Arab attitudes, rate Husayn's public image high for courage and the heroism with which his army fought.

3. Husayn will suffer in the long term from any permanent loss of territory. However, he can probably survive, albeit in shaky condition, for the short term if he loses only the Old City portion of Jerusalem and minor strategic points along the previous (prior to 5 June) Israeli-Jordanian border. This estimate is based on the assumption that the UAR will also suffer some permanent territorial losses such as strategic portions of Sinai, including the Gaza Strip and Sharm ash-Shaykh.

4. It is doubtful that Husayn could retain his throne beyond six months if the Israelis retain permanently all the territory they hold as of this date.

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5. The GOJ estimates that there are 29,000-30,000 refugees in the East Bank who arrived there during the Israeli seizure of the West Bank. The GOJ believes it can house and feed these refugees temporarily. It is doubtful that it could do so beyond a one-two month period. As the refugees can be expected to number among their ranks many of the leading political figures of the West Bank their presence in and around Amman will definitely increase the public security load on the police and the Husayn regime. It will probably be sometime, however, before the full impact of the refugee pressure will become operative against Husayn and his regime.

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